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Since the 1980s, the trend in the United States’ criminal justice 
system has been to punish children harshly and to subject them to the same 
sentences that adult offenders face.1 By some estimates, over 200,000 
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youth are tried, sentenced, or incarcerated as adults every year.2 On any 
given day, adult jails hold more than 4,200 juveniles, while adult prisons 
hold 1,300.3 However, in response to a greater understanding of adolescent 
brain development and maturity, courts have recently begun to 
acknowledge the differences between youth and adults in terms of 
culpability.4 For example, in a trilogy of cases—Roper v. Simmons, 
Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama—the U.S. Supreme Court 
found the differences in culpability were constitutionally significant for 
the purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.5 
In each of these three cases, the Court’s decision turned on attributes or 
factors inherent in youth, finding those under eighteen less culpable for 
their crimes under the Eighth Amendment.6 The factors the Court 
considered included an offender’s (1) lack of maturity and underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility, (2) vulnerability to negative influences and limited 
control over the offender’s environment, and (3) lack of characteristics that 
can be rehabilitated.7 The Court reasoned that when considering such 
factors, a crime committed as a juvenile cannot be said to be indicative of 
a youth’s individual character or of his or her propensity to commit crimes 
in the future.8 Accordingly, scholars argue, sentences that fail to reflect an 
adolescent’s capacity for change should be unconstitutional or, at least, 
should not be mandatorily imposed.9 
In response to Roper, Graham, Miller, and recent developments in 
adolescent brain science, many states have begun to reform their 
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sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders.10 Since 2007, only seven 
states11 have failed to change their legislation to grant juvenile justice 
eligibility to juveniles ages sixteen and seventeen who have previously 
been automatically included in the criminal justice system as adults.12 
States that have adopted Raise the Age (RTA)13 legislation have seen a 
direct causal decrease in incarcerated youth and recidivism.14 Despite 
these efforts, none of the current sentencing schemes recognize young 
adults in any sort of special category that allows for mitigation based on 
their lack of maturity.15 The Court itself has previously recognized the 
“shallow truth of age,” holding youth to be “more than a chronological 
fact” and instead “a time and condition of life when a person may be more 
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”16 Still, no state 
currently authorizes juvenile jurisdiction17 past the age of eighteen.18 
In a recent Washington Supreme Court opinion, State v. O’Dell, the 
court officially recognized that a defendant’s youthfulness may support an 
exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable to an adult 
felony defendant.19 The state of Washington charged O’Dell with second 
degree rape of a child.20 At sentencing, the defense asked the court to 
impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range because “[t]he 
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or to 
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Young Adults, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2014). 
 16. Id. at 669 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
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 18. TEMPLE U. CRIM. JUST. DEP’T, supra note 12, at 1. 
 19. State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 368 (Wash. 2015). 
 20. Id. at 360. 
1334 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1331 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, was significantly 
impaired by youth.”21 His counsel also argued that “[h]ad the incident 
happened two weeks prior[,] . . . [O’Dell] would be facing 15–36 weeks 
in a well-guarded juvenile detention facility. . . rather than 78–102 months 
in an adult prison.”22 Continuing its argument at the sentencing hearing, 
the defense cited portions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper 
v. Simmons, relying on various medical and psychiatric associations whose 
research indicated that juveniles are more susceptible to negative 
influences and impulsive behavior and therefore are less morally culpable 
for their crimes relative to adults.23 The trial court acknowledged this 
argument but ruled that it could not consider age as a mitigating 
circumstance under the Washington State Court of Appeals decision in 
State v. Ha’mim.24 The O’Dell Court of Appeals affirmed and the 
Washington Supreme Court granted review. The Washington Supreme 
Court held that the trial court erred in failing to consider youth as a possible 
mitigating factor because O’Dell satisfied the two-part test the court 
applies to determine whether a factor legally supports a departure from the 
standard sentencing range.25 
This Note argues that the O’Dell decision was a watershed moment 
for criminal justice reform. It argues that the reasoning in O’Dell should 
be seized upon by the legislature to take action to remediate instances in 
which defendants are legal adults but do not possess the cognitive 
characteristics of an adult sufficient to justify adult punishment. Given 
both the scientific impossibility of identifying a precise age at which 
characteristics of youthfulness end and adulthood begins and the Court’s 
repeated recognition that these very factors impact culpability, the current 
approach to sentencing young offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five as 
adults simply because they are of the age of majority cannot stand. Instead, 
this Note argues that Washington should add to its sentencing guideline 
departure statute26 a direct subsection that would require Washington 
courts to consider a defendant’s youthfulness at the time the offense was 
committed, if the offender falls into the young adult offender category. 
 
 21. Id. at 361.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
 24. Id. (citing State v. Ha’mim, 916 P.2d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 25. Id. at 363. To satisfy the two-part test, first, “a factor cannot support the imposition of an 
exceptional sentence if the legislature necessarily considered that factor when it established the 
standard sentencing range.” Id. Second, “in order to justify an exceptional sentence, a factor must be 
‘sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same 
category.’” Id. (quoting State v. Alexander, 888 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1995)); see also Ha’mim, 916 P.2d 
971. 
 26. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2019). 
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Part I of this Note provides background information regarding the 
relationship between youthfulness and culpability and gives an overview 
of the historical foundations of juvenile law and its development over time. 
Part II describes the advancements in neurological and psychological 
scientific research that courts have begun to use in evaluating the 
youthfulness of an offender. Furthermore, Part II breaks down the 
combined immaturities of the brain—distinguishing between behavioral 
and structural immaturities—and examines how these immaturities 
present themselves in a young offender. Part III then describes in detail 
how the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized these advancements in 
adolescent brain science in their holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller. 
Additionally, Part III examines Washington State’s response to these cases 
and highlights the importance of the findings from O’Dell for offenders 
over the age of eighteen. Finally, Part IV argues that the courts should be 
afforded the ability to depart from the sentencing guidelines for 
psychologically and neurologically immature defendants even when those 
defendants are older than eighteen years of age. Courts should be granted 
this ability through passage of new laws to amend the sentencing 
guidelines. Under such a scheme, it would be mandatorily presumed that 
defendants who fall within this age category meet the court’s “youthful” 
criterion and likewise have a right to a downward departure in the sentence 
guideline calculation. Further, upon such a finding, a young offender 
would be permitted to serve his or her time in the appropriate state juvenile 
detention facility where the offender could participate in programs and 
policies focusing on rehabilitation and reintegration. 
I. CHANGES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE LAWS 
Throughout the early 1900s, states began establishing juvenile courts 
as an alternative means to criminal courts for the handling of cases of 
young offenders.27 The juvenile courts were designed to be therapeutic in 
nature, with the goal of intervening in the life of a troubled child and 
shifting his or her criminal trajectory.28 Juvenile courts devised 
individually tailored, remedial plans for young offenders based on that 
child’s best interest and focused on rehabilitation.29 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, concerns about juvenile “super-
predators who maim and murder without remorse or fear” became the 
prevailing societal concern.30 As the media sensationalized violent crimes 
 
 27. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 101, 150 (2014). 
 28. Id. at 151. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 152–154. 
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committed by juveniles, the public began to demand that youth who 
committed “adult crimes” do “adult time.”31 Legislators, as a result, found 
it politically advantageous to start cracking down on youth crime, pushing 
for harsher, more retributive punishments for adolescents.32 
Many states enacted laws that made it easier, and more often 
mandatory, to transfer juvenile offenders from juvenile or family court to 
adult criminal court.33 Numerous states increased the types of crimes that 
trigger transfer and most lowered the age at which it could occur.34 A 
majority of states passed laws that created a presumption of transfer for 
juveniles older than twelve or thirteen who committed a serious offense; a 
third of states also enacted statutes authorizing prosecutorial waiver.35 
Perhaps even more significant, thirteen states lowered the age at which 
juvenile court jurisdiction ended to fifteen or sixteen.36 These increases in 
“processing youth through the adult penal system” quickly proved to 
“have serious consequences including increased physical and sexual 
assault in prison against incarcerated youths, the solidification of a 
criminal justice identity for youths, lack of access to age-appropriate 
education, and steep financial costs.”37 
Research in the 2000s reflected that juveniles housed in adult jails 
and prisons were more likely to face physical and sexual victimization than 
adult inmates.38 “Despite . . . encompassing less than one percent of jail 
inmates,” studies from the 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 
youth made up twenty-one percent of “sexual assault victims for inmate-
on-inmate sexual assaults in jails.”39 “Sexually exploited youth,” as a 
result, were often times “placed in solitary confinement, leading to 
elevated rates of depression and suicide attempts.”40 Further, juveniles 
held in adult jails or prisons faced suicide rates five times higher than those 
held in juvenile facilities.41 These traumas also exposed adolescents to 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 155. 
 33. Id. at 156. 
 34. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008). 
 35. Id. 
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long-term effects, “including future adjustment difficulties and mental 
health issues.”42 
In addition to “threats to physical safety, . . . the processing of youth 
through adult criminal justice systems . . . [proved to] promote an 
entrenchment” into the criminal lifestyle for the youth that would 
otherwise have been seemingly avoided. Essentially during a formative 
period in life, an incarcerated “youth’s peer group becomes exclusively 
comprised of other [youth and adults] who have broken the law.”43 This 
“social environment[al]” change shifted “what the youth perceive[d] as 
honorable, ethical, and moral,” and the “lack of exposure to law-abiding 
peers result[ed] in significant repercussions.”44 Instead, youth who 
otherwise “would have naturally desisted from criminal behavior 
continued to maintain contact with the criminal justice system.”45 The 
environment became “a place where the youth felt most accepted, worthy, 
and at home,” and the result was more criminal behavior in the long run.46 
All of these consequences were a far cry from the “therapeutic” indicatives 
of juvenile criminal justice reforms set out in the 1990s.47 
Majority of youth also saw “a disruption of their educational 
trajectory” as adult prisons do not have “developmentally appropriate 
courses” available.48 The resulting lack of access “often compound[s]” 
because “youth involved with the justice system . . . often already 
perform[] below grade level” at the time of imprisonment.49 These 
“educational setbacks” result in “substantially diminish[ed]” future 
opportunities for youth to gain lawful post-incarceration employment.50 
Housing youths in adult criminal systems also proved to be 
expensive. While these costs “vary from state to state, in all states, this 
cost [was and continues to be,] a significant expenditure.”51 California, for 
example, spent as much as $81,000 per inmate per year in 2019.52 Notably, 
however, for youth facing less serious charges who remained in juvenile 
court jurisdiction, diversion programs were far less costly and provided 
youth with connections to much-needed resources,53 including mental 
 
 42. Tabashneck, supra note 37, at 15. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. How Much Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (2019), 
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health treatment, educational support, health care, and job training.54 In 
comparison to those youth facing detention and incarceration, youth in 
diversion programs faced better outcomes with diminished recidivism 
rates and higher rates of educational attainment and employment.55 
For the last two decades, “juvenile crime rates have steadily 
decreased, yet the harsh punishments of the 1990s [continue to] remain in 
many state laws.”56 “With this shift, [the] key distinctive and rehabilitative 
approaches [that once formed] . . . the juvenile justice system have been 
lost to the more severe consequences” that come as a result of “criminal 
justice system involvement.”57 Since 2010, however, “half of the states” 
that once saw “all [sixteen] and [seventeen]-year-olds” excluded from 
“juvenile court based solely on their age have [since] changed their 
laws.”58 Now, unless a juvenile has been charged with or convicted of a 
serious offense, it is presumed that most “who touch the justice system 
will fall under juvenile court jurisdiction.”59 Of the seven states remaining 
who have set the age of jurisdiction below age eighteen, a majority are 
expected to consider raising the age proposals for certain groups of 
teenagers.60 The basis for this “continuing change” reflects the “growing 
acknowledgement that raising the age is good public policy.”61 
With “increasingly more scientifically proven and cost-effective 
ways to address delinquency,” today’s policymakers in the remaining 
seven states can now change laws governing the age of jurisdiction with a 
clear roadmap showing how they “can contain costs and enhance public 
safety while absorbing sixteen and seventeen-year-olds into their youth 
justice systems.”62 Those states that have already expanded their age 
jurisdiction requirements have found an increase in community safety, a 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. For example, after implementing a redirection program that diverts selected youth from 
residential programs to less costly therapy based community programs, Florida has cumulatively saved 
$211 million, averaging a savings of $31,000 per graduating youth. KRISTEN STALEY & MICHELLE 
WEEMHOFF, MI. COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ., THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME: MAKING THE CASE 
FOR WISE INVESTMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 18 (2013), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/03cb01_314 
cc9cf69154f0ab8bba66b9323d826.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP8K-UMEA]. Additionally, participating 
youth are 31% less likely to be arrested after completion and 35% less likely to enter adult prison than 
non-participating youth. Id. 
 56. Youth in the Justice System: An Overview, JUV. L. CTR., https://jlc.org/youth-justice-system-
overview [https://perma.cc/7NKV-9DL9]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 11, at 3. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 6. 
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decrease in long-term trauma and victimization, and a reduction in the 
disproportionate impact of the justice system for young people of color.63 
II. ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE & REDUCED CULPABILITY 
In addition to an increased recognition of the above collateral 
consequences and the shifting dynamics of age in the adult prison system, 
developments in neuroscience have begun to impact the legal system’s 
understanding of juvenile criminal behavior. Scientists are now able to use 
“modern medical technology to explore the neurological bases for how 
adolescents think and what differentiates them from adults.”64 Through 
these “psychological and neurological advances,” scientists have 
“prove[n] that juveniles act impulsively, react rashly, and engage in risky 
behavior[] without appreciation for the potential consequences due to 
psychological and autonomically immaturity.”65 
A. Behavioral Immaturity 
Collectively, “adolescents have proven to be generally immature in 
three separate, but related, ways: (1) adolescents are more likely to engage 
in risky behavior than adults; (2) adolescents are less capable of 
controlling their impulses than adults; and (3) adolescents are less capable 
of regulating their emotional responses than adults.”66 Emerging research 
explains why “adolescents tend to engage in far more risky behavior than 
adults.” Previously believed to stem from “youthful ignorance,” it is more 
likely that “risk-taking [behavior] comes from a psychological 
misperception of potential rewards for risky behavior.”67 “Adolescents 
have a less[er] ability . . . to regulate their emotional responses to stimuli,” 
which can “result in actions being taken without full consideration or 
appreciation” of the consequences.68 Adolescents are also more likely to 
engage in risk-taking behavior when they are in the presence of peers.69 
“This is associated with ‘greater neural activity in the areas of the brain 
associated with reward processing’ because ‘adolescents appear to place 
unique reward value on the presence of peers.’”70 
 
 63. Id. at 9–10. 
 64. Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: The Role of Brain Science in 
Protecting Adolescents, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 454 (2014). 
 65. Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 963, 970 (2014). 
 66. Preston & Crowther, supra note 64. 
 67. Id. at 456. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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Additionally, adolescents are limited in impulse control because  
they lack the capacity for self-direction.71 “Without these controls  
fully developed, adolescents lack a ‘cornerstone of cognitive 
development.’”72 Regardless of whether “adolescents ha[ve] the cognitive 
skills to . . . [weigh] the costs and benefits of their actions, their 
impulsivity . . . [still has the power to] propel them into making unwise 
decisions.”73 
When it comes to “emotional regulation,” a variety of stressors can 
affect an adolescent’s ability to effectively regulate their behavior, leading 
them “to experience emotional states that are more extreme and more 
variable than those experienced by adults.”74 These realities render youth 
“more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” 
including their families and peers.75 
B. Structural & Functional Immaturity 
The physiological aspects of the adolescent brain are “fundamentally 
different than they will be later on in adulthood.” One of the most 
noteworthy structural differences lies in the development of the “prefrontal 
cortex—the region of the brain that controls the ‘executive functions,’ 
including emotional regulation, impulse control, working memory, risk 
assessment, and the ability to evaluate future consequences.”76 Upon 
reaching its maturity, the “prefrontal cortex . . . [controls] impulsive 
behavioral” reactions that would otherwise be controlled by “earlier 
develop[ed] regions of the brain.”77 However, this maturation does not 
occur until early adulthood, well into the mid-twenties.78 During formative 
years, “decision-making and responses to stimuli are largely [controlled] 
by the amygdala and other more primitive neurological regions.”79 “As the 
brain [continues to] develop[] through adolescence and into . . . adulthood, 
the communication between regions of the brain” begin to parallel in 
improvement.80 These changes allow “complicated information to flow 
more freely, and for areas of the brain associated with high-level reasoning 
to . . . [take] control.”81 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 457. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 463. 
 76. Straley, supra note 65. 
 77. Id. at 970. 
 78. Id. at 971. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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Developmental studies also indicate that, “in addition to these 
structural immaturities, . . . the adolescent brain functions differently than 
. . . [that of] an adult.” Specifically, “adolescents and adults exhibit 
different patterns of brain activity during decision-making tasks.”82 During 
structural development, adolescent and “teenage brains . . . produce an 
imbalance of dopamine and serotonin, the neurotransmitters that regulate 
pleasure and the desire for rewards.”83 This unstable interplay “causes 
correspondingly stronger desires for immediate pleasure and 
gratification . . . while also rendering [adolescents] less able to resist those 
heightened urges.”84 “These functional differences help explain why 
‘adolescents experience . . . [increased] motivation for risky and reward-
seeking behavior without a corresponding increase in the ability to self-
regulate behavior.’”85 
These “neurological immaturities” are observable in “psychological 
studies and controlled observations of [adolescent] . . .  behavior.”86 
“Teenagers [habitually] score significantly lower than adults on 
assessments” that measure impulse control and the ability to suppress 
aggression.87 Additionally, “youth who have developed cognitive abilities 
similar to adults [still] do not have the same ability to self-regulate their 
behaviors, modulate their emotions, or [properly] weigh the consequences 
of their actions.”88 The “combination of a [physically] developing brain 
and the [neurological] . . . tendency toward risk, impulsivity, and limited 
judgement often results in criminal conduct.”89 
Statistically, it is typical for an adolescent “to engage in some form 
of criminal behavior during . . . [adolescence].”90 Given these statistics, 
traditional rationales supporting criminal sanctions—retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—apply with less force to 
children and young offenders than to adults.91 Retribution is less 
compelling based on a youth’s limited ability to control criminal behavior 
and understand emotional impulses, rendering them less culpable than 
adults.92 Similarly, deterrence is less likely to be effective with young 
adults because “their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity . . . make 
 
 82. Preston & Crowther, supra note 64, at 460. 
 83. Straley, supra note 65, at 971. 
 84. Id. at 971–72. 
 85. Preston & Crowley, supra note 64, at 460. 
 86. Straley, supra note 65, at 972. 
 87. Id.. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012). 
 92. Id. 
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them less likely to consider potential punishment.”93 Furthermore, 
incapacitation does not justify applying adult penalties to youth, such as 
life without parole, because “[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever 
will be a danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] 
is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”94  
And finally, long-term sentencing for youth reflects “‘an irrevocable 
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,’ at odds with a 
child’s capacity for change,” “forswear[ing] altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal” of incarceration.95 
III. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION 
A. Roper v. Simmons 
In 2005, psychological and neurological evidence-based studies on 
youthfulness found their way into U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. In 
Roper v. Simmons, Christopher Simmons sought postconviction relief 
after he was sentenced to capital punishment for murder.96 Simmons 
argued that, despite the severity of his crime, the execution of an individual 
who committed a crime when he was younger than eighteen years old is 
prohibited under reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia.97 The U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed and held that precedent, specifically Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,98 provided sufficient evidence that society views juveniles as 
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”99 
Specifically, the Court relied on three differences between juveniles 
and adults in making their decision: lack of maturity, vulnerability to 
negative influences and outside pressures, and failure to have well-formed 
characters.100 These findings, according to the Court, reflected what 
psychological and neurological studies confirmed—that young offenders 
were held to be less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes, 
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less likely to be deterred by the prospect of death sentences, and less likely 
to be irretrievably depraved.101 
While the Roper court addressed the psychological and neurological 
differences between juveniles under eighteen years old and those of adults, 
it remained firm in its acknowledgement that there must be limitations to 
its application. Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion that “[t]he 
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an 
individual turns 18.”102 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to conclude that 
the line for death penalty eligibility should rest squarely with the societal 
distinction of adulthood.103 The Court reasoned that because eighteen 
years is “where society draws the line for many purposes between 
childhood and adulthood,”104 so too should it be used as the line where 
“death eligibility ought to rest.”105 The Court thus rejected use of a case-
by-case standard of review in favor of a bright-line rule protecting all 
offenders below the age of eighteen years old from the death penalty, 
regardless of culpability.106 
B. Graham v. Florida 
With Roper “having banned the use of the death penalty [as a 
sentence] for juveniles,” life without parole remained the “harshest 
sentence available for offenses committed” by young offenders under 
eighteen years post-Roper.107 In Graham v. Florida, the Court considered 
a challenge to the mandatory life sentence of seventeen-year-old Terrance 
Jamar Graham, who had committed a pair of nonhomicide felony 
offenses.108 The Court held that Graham’s life without parole sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, recognizing that “nonhomicide 
offenses d[id] not warrant the most serious punishment available” for 
juveniles—a “concept of proportionality . . . central to the Eighth 
Amendment.”109 In its opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, the Court cited 
a number of concerns rooted in developmental neuroscience as the basis 
for its decision: “(1) the offender’s limited culpability, (2) the particular 
severity of life imprisonment without parole, and (3) the failure of 
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without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/4JP6-UJG7]. 
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penological theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation to justify such punishment.”110 
The Court relied on Roper’s reasoning that “juveniles are less 
culpable and . . . less deserving of the most severe punishments because 
they lack maturity, are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside 
pressures” and have yet to fully form their characters.111 The Graham court 
also noted that no recent data provided a basis to reexamine the 
sociological and scientific findings used as a foundation for its decision in 
Roper.112 Instead the Court clarified what it had left ambiguous in Roper: 
that it “believed neuroscience [to be] relevant to general propositions as to 
the normal developmental course of adolescence.”113 
Regarding the severity of life sentencing, the Court acknowledged 
the reality that young offenders generally serve more years and a greater 
percentage of their lives behind bars than adults—”[a] 16-year-old and a 
75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same 
punishment in name only.”114 As a result, the Court acknowledged that 
imposing such a punishment on younger offenders was especially harsh.115 
Finally, in considering penological justifications, the Court found 
that none of the goals of punishment provided an adequate justification for 
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole.116  
The Court ruled out retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation, finding that Graham’s sentence was by its nature 
disproportionate and failed to pass the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
unusual punishment test.117 
C. Miller v. Alabama 
Following the decisions of Roper and Graham, “approximately 
2,500 offenders [remained] serving sentences of life without parole” for 
homicide-related crimes committed as juveniles.118 In 2012, deciding 
Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs jointly,119 the Court extended its 
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reliance on the developmental differences between youth and adults, 
holding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory sentencing 
schemes that do not allow judges or juries to consider the mitigating 
characteristics of youth.”120 The Court used Roper and Graham as a 
foundation for its decision, citing that they established a jurisdictional 
precedent that “children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing.”121 
Once again, the Court relied on the developmental distinctions of 
youth that render them less culpable and impair the traditional penological 
justifications for punishment.122 This time, however, the Court combined 
Roper and Graham’s focus (prohibiting severe punishments based on 
reduced culpability)123 with another jurisdictional precedent that requires 
sentencing authorities to consider a defendant’s specific characteristics 
when determining punishment.124 In her opinion, “Justice Kagan 
emphasized that judges must be able to consider the characteristics of 
juvenile defendants in order to issue a fair and individualized sentence.”125 
The Court noted that “adolescence is marked by ‘transient rashness, 
proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences’—all factors that 
cannot be considered as crime-specific and should be considered when 
“mitigat[ing] the punishment received by juvenile defendants.”126 
Despite the Court stressing the importance of youthfulness in 
sentencing determinations, Miller firmly limited its application to only 
those under the age of eighteen.127 Rather than expanding on the Miller 
Court’s reasoning for individualized sentencing considerations, lower 
courts tend to follow suit, unwilling to blur the distinction between 
juvenile and adult offenders.128 In a recent Washington Supreme Court 
case, however, the Court recognized that the rationale behind Roper, 
Graham, and Miller could be extended to defendants in their late twenties 
at the time of their crime.129 
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D. State of Washington v. O’Dell 
In 2015, the Washington Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in 
which it first recognized the research on adolescent brain science that had 
been relied on by the United States Supreme Court over the last decade. 
Sean O’Dell130 was convicted of second-degree rape of a child for having 
sexual intercourse with a twelve-year-old girl ten days after his eighteenth 
birthday.131 The court sentenced him to a “standard range sentence for the 
offense—ninety-five months—in spite of his lawyer’s plea that he  
receive . . . a sentence below the standard range.”132 
The Washington Sentencing Reform Act statute “allows judges to 
sentence [defendants] below the presumptive standard sentencing range if 
the offense is atypical from other offenses resulting in the same conviction, 
such that there are ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ justifying an 
exceptional sentence.”133 The “statute contains a nonexclusive list of 
circumstances which could justify an exceptional sentence below the 
standard range, including that the ‘defendant’s capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of the law, was significantly impaired.’”134 “O’Dell argued 
that his youth[fulness]” fell into this category, which “prevented him from 
appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct.”135 The trial court rejected 
his argument and the Washington State Court of Appeals upheld the 
ruling.136 The Washington Supreme Court revisited the issue and reversed 
the Court of Appeals as to O’Dell’s sentence.137 
The court focused its analysis on determining whether a trial court 
may consider a defendant’s youthfulness as a possible mitigating factor  
at sentencing.138 To determine whether such a factor legally supported  
a departure from the standard sentencing range, the court applied a  
two-part test:139 
First, a factor cannot support the imposition of an exceptional 
sentence if the legislature necessarily considered that factor when it 
established the standard sentence range. Second, in order to justify an 
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exceptional sentence, a factor must be ‘sufficiently substantial and 
compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the 
same category.’140 
Applying the first prong of the test, the State contended that the 
legislature “explicitly considered . . . age” when it made the Sentencing 
Reform Act (SRA) applicable to felony offenders eighteen and older.141 
The court disagreed, finding that this argument failed for two reasons.142 
First, the court found that it had previously held that “when the legislature 
defines . . . an offense according to the victim’s age, [that alone 
has] . . . not necessarily prevent[ed] a sentencing court from relying on the 
victim’s particular age to impose an exceptional sentence.”143 Second, the 
court reasoned that, 
when the legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.030(34)—defining an 
‘offender’ subject to the SRA as ‘a person who has committed a 
felony established by state law and is eighteen years of age or 
older . . . ’—it did not have the benefit of the data underlying the 
decisions in Roper [v. Simmons], Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. 
Alabama, since the SRA’s definition of an ‘offender’ predates Roper 
by roughly 25 years.144 
Therefore, “when the legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.030(34), it did 
not have the benefit of psychological and neurological studies showing 
that the ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’ continue to 
develop well into a person’s [twenties].”145 The court concluded that it was 
precisely those differences that could justify a trial court’s finding that the 
legislature failed to “necessarily consider[] the relationship between age 
and culpability when it made the SRA applicable to all defendants” over 
the age of eighteen.146 
Applying its initial reasoning to this case, the court reasoned that, 
while the “legislature has determined that all defendants [eighteen] and 
over are, in general, equally culpable for equivalent crimes, . . . it could 
not have considered the particular vulnerabilities—for example, 
impulsivity, poor judgment, and susceptibility to outside influences—of 
specific individuals.”147 In its application of the second prong of the test, 
the court held that the past precedent, which denied the application of 
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youthfulness as a non-statutory mitigating factor under the SRA, did not 
have the benefit of the studies underlying Miller, Roper, and Graham—
studies that establish a clear connection between youth and decreased 
moral culpability.148 Now having the benefit of those advancements in 
scientific literature and with the knowledge that age may well mitigate a 
defendant’s culpability, even if that defendant is over the age of eighteen, 
the court held that a trial court must be allowed to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor when imposing a sentence on an offender like O’Dell.149 
IV. INEVITABLE CHANGES AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Following Roper, courts at both the federal and state levels, including 
Washington, have begun to consider the implications of the 
acknowledgment that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults 
do not disappear when an individual turns 18”150 and that the 
developmental and neurological science factors found applicable to 
children also apply to young adults.151 On the state level, some courts have 
begun to permit a limited consideration of youth through their state 
statutory guidelines.152 These statutes recognize the general idea that age-
based mitigation may continue past eighteen, but in application, reveal that 
youth-based mitigation is rarely used when sentencing young adult 
defendants.153 
The Eighth Amendment “must be interpreted according to its text, 
by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for 
its purpose and function in the constitutional design.”154 To implement this 
framework, courts must refer to “the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society[.]”155 Global trends and the 
advancements in adolescent brain science demand changes be made to 
existing sentencing schemes, specifically for age and evidence of 
youthfulness to inform all sentencing determinations. 
A. Age-Based Sentencing Statutes and Proposed Applications of 
Mitigation to Young Adults 
Most directly related to the Roper line of cases, litigation has begun 
to question the bright-line rule distinction drawn when an offender hits the 
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age of eighteen—a move that is both timely and necessary to advance 
juvenile justice reform. State courts have seen an increase in expert 
testimony, remarking on the development of brain science as it relates to 
the youthful offender and arguing that, knowing what we know today, the 
holding in Roper should be applied to similar cases for individuals 
eighteen, nineteen, and even twenty years old.156 
Broader trends seek to expand youthful offender statutes to include 
more young adults. As seen in O’Dell, youthful offender statutes mitigate 
sentences for certain crimes up to the age of twenty-five and provide a 
range of rehabilitative services.157 These statutes recognize the general 
idea that young adults should be treated differently than older adults. In 
recent years, two states—Colorado and Vermont—have expanded their 
youthful offender statutes to make them presumptively applicable to some 
young adults.158 
Several scholars have similarly proposed mechanisms for changes in 
sentencing that would reflect the consideration of young adult offenders 
as a special category. Barry Feld’s159 proposal, coined the “youth 
discount,” could significantly reduce sentencing lengths for young adults 
by giving fractional reductions.160 Recognizing the lesser culpability of 
developing young adults, Feld’s proposal would create a sliding scale of 
punishment by using age as a fraction basis of reduction.161 A young 
offender could receive no more than a fraction of an adult sentence, with 
the size of the fraction gradually increasing until the offender reaches a 
certain cutoff age.162 
Other reformers propose a more case-by-case approach. Elizabeth 
Scott and Laurence Steinberg163 suggest a set of reforms to create a 
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developmental approach to young adult offenders.164 This approach would 
expand youthful offender acts and build young-adult-specific prison 
facilities.165 Regarding the length of time young adults spend in prison, 
Scott and Steinberg propose a case-by-case approach.166 First, they argue 
that young adults’ relative youth should be considered at sentencing and 
then, once sentenced, that young adult offenders should be able to seek 
parole earlier than older adults.167 
While these proposals seek to reform the existing sentencing 
schemes and take into consideration age-based mitigating information, 
their controversy centers on whether we should treat young adults 
differently than adults. The focus should instead be the degree to which 
we treat young adults like children. 
B. A More Robust Sentencing Scheme 
While clear in certain respects, the opinion in O’Dell left ample room 
for interpretation and expansion that arguably does not go far enough. In 
its holding, citing the Roper line of case conclusions—that youth have 
diminished capacity and that youthful features do not disappear at 
eighteen—the court concluded that age could mitigate culpability and 
justify a sentence below state guidelines on a case-by-case basis.168 This 
begged the question of how frequently future courts would actually apply 
an exceptional sentence for defendants other than O’Dell. 
Just one year later, in State v. Alden, the Washington State Court of 
Appeals refused to apply the ruling in O’Dell to mitigate the sentence of a 
twenty-three-year-old who had “maturity and academic drive.”169 
Similarly, in a recent 2019 case, the Court of Appeals rejected the 
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defendant’s request to consider youth as a mitigating factor when his 
crimes were committed when he was between fourteen and sixteen years 
old.170 The court determined that the holding in O’Dell did not constitute 
a significant change in the law and that it did not affect a sentencing 
imposition that occurred when he was tried for the crimes as an adult.171 
It thus appears unlikely that the case-by-case statutory scheme that 
Washington currently has in place in regard to young adult offenders will 
lead to palpable changes in young adult sentencing. A presumptive 
sentencing scheme would much better serve criminal sentencing purposes. 
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Miller, developmental science 
has proven that youthful attributions do not disappear the moment an 
offender turns eighteen.172 If sentencing schemes took into account the full 
timeline of human brain development, young adults would receive shorter 
sentences that would ensure that the penological goals of the justice system 
are still being met. 
In her 2014 article titled Extending Sentencing Mitigation for 
Deserving Young Adults, scholar Kelsey B. Shust argues for the imposition 
of a nationwide rebuttable presumption when sentencing young adults.173 
Shust maintains that a permissive scheme would allow for defendants up 
to the age of twenty-five to seek mitigation.174 Under this design, 
“[defendants] would have to reasonably show . . . that they (1) lacked 
maturity and had underdeveloped responsibility, (2) were vulnerable to 
negative influences and had limited control over their environment, and 
(3) lacked characters that could be rehabilitated.”175 The prosecution 
would then have the burden of showing “by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendants were sufficiently mature to be punished 
according to the legislature’s design.”176 
While such a case-by-case permissive presumption would certainly 
alter sentencing for young offenders across the nation, in light of O’Dell, 
this scheme is not enough for Washington. Instead, a mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption would much better serve criminal sentencing 
purposes. In adopting such a structure, a defendant’s youthfulness would 
be an assumed mitigating factor. Like the younger defendants protected 
by Roper, Graham, and Miller, a young adult would be presumed to lack 
maturity, be vulnerable to negative influences, and lack developmental 
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characteristics. The burden would lie with the prosecution to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence,177 that the defendant was sufficiently 
mature enough to be punished according to the adult sentencing scheme. 
If the prosecutor can prove that, more likely than not, the young adult 
offender did not possess the characteristics of youthfulness that  
would warrant mitigation, adult sentencing guidelines would become 
available for consideration. If, however, the prosecutor failed to present 
such rebuttable evidence, the court would be required to apply an 
exceptional sentence. 
There are two reasons to prefer a mandatory rebuttable presumption 
over the existing “case-by-case basis” sentencing scheme. First is the 
inability to definitively identify what constitutes adult-like culpability 
among young adult offenders. Culpability is not an objectively 
quantifiable object that can be readily measured.  Without an initial system 
of uniformity, one less blameworthy young adult may have age considered 
as a mitigating factor, while another who is an equally as blameworthy 
young adult may not. A mandatory presumption reduces the potential for 
bias and over-punishment for all less-culpable individuals. 
Second, adopting a mandatory presumption would combat a judge or 
jury’s inability to fairly weigh the mitigating factor of youthfulness against 
a charged crime. As recognized by the Roper Court, the nature of a 
particularly violent crime is likely to overpower any mitigating arguments 
based on age even in cases where the offender’s youthfulness would 
require a reduction in sentencing.178 A mandatory presumption would help 
to combat the difficulty a judge or jury might have in distinguishing 
between a person’s responsibility and their related culpability. 
A mandatory, rebuttable presumption scheme would offer young 
offenders the chance to receive categorical reductions from adult sentences 
while supporting the judicial objective of reducing long term recidivism. 
Shorter sentencing schemes would allow for young adult offenders to be 
held accountable for their crimes while also promoting the opportunity for 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society—the true aims of the criminal 
justice system. 
C. A Change in Correctional Facilities 
Promising reforms have been implemented in the juvenile justice 
system over the past generation which have provided policymakers with 
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guidance for focusing their work on young adult offenders. While no 
current blueprint exists for the creation of a specialized facility aimed at 
young adult offenders in Washington, effective juvenile justice programs, 
policies, and practices are being tailored to include the unique needs  
of this population.179 These programs include, for example, multi-systemic 
therapy, which has been show to effectively reduce recidivism,  
substance abuse and other mental health services, and social skills 
training—all proven to be essential components of a successful 
rehabilitative program.180 
As the scientific evidence continues to advance in the realm of 
neuroscience, research supports the creation of a system that recognizes 
the diminished capacity of young adults while harnessing the opportunities 
presented by their ability to grow, adapt, and change. As referenced in Part 
II of this Note, today’s neurobiology suggests that young adults ages 
eighteen to twenty-five are more developmentally akin to juveniles than 
mature adults and are more apt to reform when presented with the 
appropriate measures of support.181 
As the need for distinction between adult and juvenile court remains 
well-established due to the recognized developmental differences, it must 
then follow that a substantially different response is necessary for young 
adults in the justice system. Therefore, upon a judicial finding of 
youthfulness, a young adult should serve their imposed exceptional 
sentence in the appropriate state Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration 
(JRA) facility. Time served in a JRA would provide these young offenders 
with programs and facilities that would aid in promoting their integration 
into the larger society as productive adults. With access to the appropriate 
in-facility programming, such as education, job training, and mental and 
physical health treatment, a reduction in recidivism rates would likely be 
seen182—a statistic which, based on available data, puts young adults at a 
staggering seventy-eight percent recidivism rate within three years.183 
Additionally, if young adults were able to avoid exposure to the adult 
prison system, they would not face the attributable collateral 
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consequences, such as laws that limit their ability to get jobs, receive 
student loans, and live in certain kinds of housing.184 
While concerns exist regarding the incorporation of young adults in 
the juvenile system,185 the proposed model would take into consideration 
the mental and emotional age of each young adult and evaluate whether 
the matter should be handled in juvenile or adult detention. Opposition for 
“raising the age” often challenges the lenient nature of the juvenile system, 
arguing that the addition of young adult offenders would negatively impact 
public safety and readily destabilize an existing system.186 A mandatory 
presumption would alleviate the preeminent concern over integration and 
public safety by ensuring that only those with the applicable and necessary 
characteristics are able to attain the greater benefit of juvenile status. 
CONCLUSION 
Roper, Graham, and Miller form a basis for the integration of 
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. O’Dell takes it one step 
further for Washington by allowing youthfulness to be among the 
considerations eligible as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Based on the 
developments of adolescent brain science and its application to these 
Eighth Amendment cases, scholars and courts alike have begun to address 
age as a proxy for culpability. Culpability, however, is not quantitative and 
cannot be measured to determine how much a young adult offender 
possesses. A rebuttable mandatory, presumptive sentencing scheme would 
combat the unknown nature of culpability, while supporting the current 
trend of providing greater protections for our nation’s young adults. 
Further, allowing young adults to serve their time in an approved state 
juvenile facility would lead to palpable changes in recidivism and 
adolescent growth because of its focus on rehabilitation, confidentiality, 
and family engagement. 
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